What follows is a brief take on excerpts from the ISW blog post "Iran Positions for Reset in Iraq after Recapture of Mosul" by Emily Anagnostos. Note: Anagnostos' text in italics, Mark Pyruz’s comments in yellow.
ISW: “Iran has tolerated U.S. presence in Iraq because the U.S. provided sufficient airpower and training to combat ISIS.”
Intel on Iran: Additionally, Iran may have identified American military logistical support as critical for ISF to more effectively combat ISIL.
ISW: “It has also backed Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi because his premiership was a condition of U.S. support and because PM Abadi is too weak to resist Iranian control.”
Intel on Iran: Iraq’s territorial integrity remains a priority for Iran. Additionally, Iran calculated Iraqi parliamentarian perception of Abadi as that of being “installed” by the U.S., effectively burdening the prospective leader from the start and indeed among Iraq's parliament the prevailing popular perception of Abadi remains that of a weak PM. Being the follower and not the initiator of the Battle of Tikrit, as well as his failure to deliver the liberation of Mosul before the end of 2016 further served to reinforce this perception. However the liberation of Mosul may indeed render a popular boost for the PM, if only temporarily.
ISW: “Pro-Iranian groups in Iraq will likely consider the recapture of Mosul as the end of major anti-ISIS operations in Iraq and continued U.S. presence unnecessary and unwelcomed.”
Intel on Iran: Iran faces a similar focus of popular and legislative attention following the liberation of Mosul and effective defeat of ISIL. That the Iran-supported PMF will portray its raison d'être and mission to that of a national guard force appears likely.
ISW: “Recent U.S. statements suggest that the U.S. may increase, not decrease, its involvement in Iraq after Mosul, which is likely accelerating Iran’s efforts to expel the U.S. from the region.”
Intel on Iran: Recent statements intended for the U.S. domestic audience regarding potential seizure of Iraqi oil resources as well as travel and immigration bans from Iraq into the U.S. serve to provide Iran with political points of alignment with their Iraq counterparts, with which to exploit increased levels of influence. This burdens efforts towards effecting an American primacy of influence over Iran, in Iraq.
ISW: “Iran has started to consolidate its proxies in Iraq, including a reconciliation between Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr and senior pro-Iranian officials, in order to both increase pressure on PM Abadi against further Western support and establish Iraq as a base from which it can project regional influence.“
Intel on Iran: That there are specific points of convergence within common regional interests shared by Iraq and Iran can not be denied. After the fall of Mosul and with it a more stabilized security environment in general, measures of economic support may offer the most effective means of leverage for the United States in the contest of influence in Iraq.
ISW: “Former PM Nouri al-Maliki will aim to convince Iran that he, as prime minister, would support the power shift from the U.S. to Iran in order to secure Iran’s political support for 2018 parliamentary elections.”
Intel on Iran: The political relations between Iran and Iraq are more complex and more dynamic than the former simply seeking to dominate the latter. For example, there are instances where Iraqi political figures line up with Iranian political figures, in forms of transnational factionalism, that in effect exert influences and sometimes outcomes in both or either country.
Iran maintains relationships with various sections of the Iraqi landscape that stretch back decades. Moreover, Iranian political support remains relevant in Iraqi politics. Whether or not American resources should be exerted in attempting to subvert this prevailing regional condition requires U.S. policy advocates to calculate the chances of success, matched up with and against expected required resource allocation for the desired outcome(s). Put bluntly, this contest may involve an adroitly administered application of what is generally considered constituting “nation building.”
No comments:
Post a Comment