Khorramshahr MRBM said to be related to DPRK Musudan

File photo: Hwasong-10 (Musudan) IRBMs seen at a military parade in Pyongyang

U.S. officials at the Pentagon are linking the Khorramshahr MRBM to that of the Hwasong-10 (aka BM-25, Musudan) mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile developed by North Korea.

According to Kyle Mizokami:

An anonymous U.S. government official told Reuters the missile was launched from a test site near Senman [sic], east of the Iranian capital of Tehran, and said it was the same type of missile last tested in April 2016.

As pointed out by arms control expert Jeffrey Lewis on Twitter, the Pentagon identified the July 2016 missile as a locally produced version of the Musudan, a North Korean intermediate-range missile. Also known as the Hwaso

The Musudan has been adapted from a submarine-launched missile to a road-mobile missile, and is launched from 12-wheeled heavy transporters. The missile has a payload of 2,000 to 2,500 pounds and a theoretical maximum range of 2,500 miles. The range of the missile is open to some debate because so far, despite Pyongyang's claims to the contrary, it hasn't been successfully tested. North Korea may have launched as many as eight Musudans in 2016 alone, and not a single launch was considered successful by outside observers.

COMMENT: Iran has yet to publicly unveil an adapted design related to the Hwasong-10. However the Khorramshahr has been verbally publicized on 25SEP2016 by MODAFL Brig. Gen. Hossein Deghan at an assemblage of Iran’s Parliament.

U.S. intelligence sources are said to have ascertained this ballistic missile type. If accurate, then the Khorramshahr ballistic missile project is likely being developed and tested by Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO).

It is possible the Hwasong-10 and Khorramshahr projects may represent a binational, dual agency approach towards the development, testing and production of an IRBM.

Note: another possible explanation for the test is that it's related to Iran's Simorgh ("Phoenix") series space launch vehicle (SLV) program.

Currently the UNSC has referred the 29JAN2017 Iranian test launch to its committee on Iran, for investigation.

Iran test fires 'Khorramshahr' ballistic missile

U.S. officials report that on 29JAN2017 Iran test fired a ballistic missile from the Semnan Missile Complex. Identified as  a Khorramshahr MRBM, "the medium-range ballistic missile flew 600 miles before exploding."

The Khorramshahr MRBM was previously publicized on 25SEP2016 by MODAFL Brig. Gen. Hossein Dehghan before an assemblage of Iran's parliament. It was identified for its "high-precision" strike capability, as a component of Iran's deterrent-based, second-strike defense doctrine.

Controversy exists over the wording and intent of U.N. Security Council resolution 1929, whereby "Iran is prohibited from undertaking any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons..." The United States position has been to include existing and under-development Iranian MRBMs; while Iran specifically accepted the wording durning negotiation of the JCPOA, as meaning missiles capable of carrying an existing Iranian nuclear weapon, which Iran denies the existence of as well as any program to develop such a device. Moreover it is considered unlikely that such test launches would garner the necessary votes at UNSC to find Iran in violation.

For its part, Iran claims its deterrent-based defense doctrine mandates a credible second-strike capability, which in turn requires continued development and periodic testing.

However, such test launches run the risk of being cited by the Trump Administration as part of a listing of cause for unilaterally pulling out of JCPOA.

Iran-supported Iraqi PMF advocates expulsion of U.S. nationals

This weekend’s signing of a U.S. executive order barring immingration and travel by Iraqi citizens into the United States is having a potential ripple effect on CJTF-OIR.

According to Reuters:

Popular Mobilization, a coalition of mainly Shiite Muslim paramilitary groups armed and trained by Iran to fight Islamic State, urged Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi's government to expel US nationals.

Influential Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr said on Sunday American citizens should leave Iraq. "It would be arrogance for you[Americans] to enter Iraq and other countries freely while barring them entrance to your country ... and therefore you should get your nationals out," he said on his website.

The IRGC is sure to capitalize on Iraqi popular reaction to this ban; where inside Iraq a contest of influence has been playing out between Iran and the United States stretching as far back as OIF. Now, however, is an ensuing, critical period of intensifying, competing interests as the Mosul military campaign culminates in the defeat of ISIS.

U.S. interests in the region would have the PMF stand down after the effective defeat of ISIS, having ISF provide security for the Republic of Iraq. However, the executive order effectively undercuts the Iraqi PM while serving to bolster popular regional perceptions towards that shared by the IRGC and PMF. That is to say, Iraq is now being rendered the same as Iran, pairing the two by means of a U.S. policy orientation.

Perhaps an intended effect of the U.S. executive order is to exert leverage on the Iraqi government to separate from Iran, during forthcoming negotiations between the Trump Administration and the Iraqi government. If so, publicly the Iraqi PM might be enabled with a rescinding of the ban, while the liberation of Mosul is at hand. Furthermore, this might even fit within the 90-day time frame of the executive order.

Paintwork and livery applied to new Iran Air A332 EP-IJA

Latest imagery dated 27JAN2017 of Iran Air Airbus A330-243E reg. EP-IJA  (msn 1540) at  Châteauroux-Centre "Marcel Dassault" Airport (CHR / LFLX). Photo by Dominique Meunier.

**Note: new aircraft registration is EP-IJA, not EP-IHA as originally reported.

Observers also note the larger "Iran Air" titles enabled on this larger aircraft type.

Delivery and arrival at THR expected second week of FEB2017.

Brief take on ISW’s “Iran Positions for Reset in Iraq after Recapture of Mosul”

What follows is a brief take on excerpts from the ISW blog post "Iran Positions for Reset in Iraq after Recapture of Mosul" by Emily Anagnostos. Note: Anagnostos' text in italics, Mark Pyruz’s comments in yellow.

ISW: “Iran has tolerated U.S. presence in Iraq because the U.S. provided sufficient airpower and training to combat ISIS.”

Intel on Iran: Additionally, Iran may have identified American military logistical support as critical for ISF to more effectively combat ISIL.

ISW: “It has also backed Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi because his premiership was a condition of U.S. support and because PM Abadi is too weak to resist Iranian control.”

Intel on Iran: Iraq’s territorial integrity remains a priority for Iran. Additionally, Iran calculated Iraqi parliamentarian perception of Abadi as that of being “installed” by the U.S., effectively burdening the prospective leader from the start and indeed among Iraq's parliament the prevailing popular perception of Abadi remains that of a weak PM. Being the follower and not the initiator of the Battle of Tikrit, as well as his failure to deliver the liberation of Mosul before the end of 2016 further served to reinforce this perception. However the liberation of Mosul may indeed render a popular boost for the PM, if only temporarily.

ISW: “Pro-Iranian groups in Iraq will likely consider the recapture of Mosul as the end of major anti-ISIS operations in Iraq and continued U.S. presence unnecessary and unwelcomed.”

Intel on Iran: Iran faces a similar focus of popular and legislative attention following the liberation of Mosul and effective defeat of ISIL. That the Iran-supported PMF will portray its raison d'être and mission to that of a national guard force appears likely.

ISW: “Recent U.S. statements suggest that the U.S. may increase, not decrease, its involvement in Iraq after Mosul, which is likely accelerating Iran’s efforts to expel the U.S. from the region.”

Intel on Iran: Recent statements intended for the U.S. domestic audience regarding potential seizure of Iraqi oil resources as well as travel and immigration bans from Iraq into the U.S. serve to provide Iran with political points of alignment with their Iraq counterparts, with which to exploit increased levels of influence. This burdens efforts towards effecting an American primacy of influence over Iran, in Iraq.

ISW: “Iran has started to consolidate its proxies in Iraq, including a reconciliation between Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr and senior pro-Iranian officials, in order to both increase pressure on PM Abadi against further Western support and establish Iraq as a base from which it can project regional influence.“

Intel on Iran: That there are specific points of convergence within common regional interests shared by Iraq and Iran can not be denied. After the fall of Mosul and with it a more stabilized security environment in general, measures of economic support may offer the most effective means of leverage for the United States in the contest of influence in Iraq.

ISW: “Former PM Nouri al-Maliki will aim to convince Iran that he, as prime minister, would support the power shift from the U.S. to Iran in order to secure Iran’s political support for 2018 parliamentary elections.”

Intel on Iran: The political relations between Iran and Iraq are more complex and more dynamic than the former simply seeking to dominate the latter. For example, there are instances where Iraqi political figures line up with Iranian political figures, in forms of transnational factionalism, that in effect exert influences and sometimes outcomes in both or either country.

Iran maintains relationships with various sections of the Iraqi landscape that stretch back decades. Moreover, Iranian political support remains relevant in Iraqi politics. Whether or not American resources should be exerted in attempting to subvert this prevailing regional condition requires U.S. policy advocates to calculate the chances of success, matched up with and against expected required resource allocation for the desired outcome(s). Put bluntly, this contest may involve an adroitly administered application of what is generally considered constituting “nation building.”

VIP trial flight to new airport on Hendorabi Island, Iran

Imagery of publicized trial flight on 24JAN2017 from Kish International Airport (KIH / OIBK) to new airport at Hendorabi Island in the Persian Gulf. [Photographer: Hossein Tahavori]

On final approach to new airport at Hendorabi Island is Pouya Air Harbin Y12-II high wing twin-engine turboprop utility aircraft.

Pouya Air Harbin Y12-II taxiing at newly constructed airport at Hendorabi Island

Eighteen VIP passengers disembark Pouya Air Harbin Y12-II utility aircraft

Curiously, aircraft bears the incomplete registration EP-PUx. Livery is similar but not exactly same as EP-PUH. Note: U.S. Treasury considers Pouya Air an extension of IRGC-QF for its part in supplying armed forces supporting the Syrian Arab Republic and is therefor subject to sanctions.

Control tower under construction at Hendorabi Island's new airport facility. Visible to the right is Bell 212 Twin Huey reg. EP-PGF, operated by Persian Gulf Aviation Service Co. (PASCO).

Newly constructed terminal building at Hendorabi Island's new airport facility

Interior detail of yet to be occupied terminal building at Hendorabi Island's new airport facility

Close-up of Bachert-type airport crash tender (No. 7) based on Mercedes-Benz NG platform

Runway length at Hendorabi Island reportedly 1450 meters, attracting short-haul regional airline aircraft such as Fokker 50 and ATR-72.

Aerial view with proximity to coast, of new airport at  Hendorabi Island, Iran

Google map location for Hendorabi Island, Iran

Recent imagery: IRGC-led T-90A tank operators in Syria

Video still of T-90A main battle tank "brew-up" by ISIL hostile action near Khanasir, Syria. Video uploaded 23JAN2017 onto social media.

T-90A tank displays flag apparently denoting Liwa Fatemiyoun operators. Liwa Fatemiyoun is an Afghan Shia militia fielded and led by IRGC-QF.

Video is also noteworthy in apparently providing imagery of a first confirmed, destroyed by hostile action T-90A. (Recently, German-made Leopard 2A4 main battle tanks have been successfully destroyed by ISIL, and before that American-made M1A1 main battle tanks operated by the Iraqi Army.)

Above: Social media imagery of a T-90A tank still bearing Russian transport-related markings, apparently operated by pro-Syrian Arab Republic militia led by IRGC-QF.

COMMENT: The Russians continue to maintain the advantage of more reliable ground partners in the Syrian conflict. That includes Iran-led militia forces. Moreover these forces recently demonstrated effectiveness in securing victory at the Battle of Aleppo. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that Russian T-90A main battle tank operators may include militia forces led by IRGC-QF such as Lebanese Hezbollah and Liwa Fatemiyoun. Moreover, tactical experience with the type ranks among the number of advancements rendered upon the IRGC-QF in this conflict.

IRIN 44th Flotilla voyage suspended at Durban, South Africa

File Photo: IRINS Bushehr (AORLH 422) Bushehr class replenishment ship

On 16JAN2017 it was reported at DefenceWeb the voyage of IRIN 44th Flotilla had been suspended at Durban, South Africa, apparently for reasons of repair to IRINS Bushehr (422) replenishment ship.

IRIN 44th Flotilla. comprising IRINS Alvand (71) and IRINS Bushehr (422) were reported on 13OCT2016 to be dispatched to the Gulf of Aden and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, proceeding to Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam on 29OCT2016. A brief sortie into the Atlantic Ocean was claimed on 21NOV2016.

CNES satellite imagery posted at IHS Jane's 360 (see below) depicts IRINS Bushehr at Dormac Dock 1, an 8500 ton floating dock taken into service last year. According to DefenceWeb: "[s]ome Durban port watchers maintain the Iranian navy vessel was the first platform to use the new addition to Dormac’s range of ship repair facilities"

 

CNES satellite imagery posted and annotated by IHS Jane's 360

IRINS Alvand is also seen docked nearby, apparently incapable of continuing the voyage back to Bandar Abbas port without the replenishment ship.

COMMENT: Iran's Navy has been undertaking these flotilla missions for some time now, projecting power to distant points such as the Mediterranean Sea, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and now the Atlantic Ocean.

Vessels that undertake these missions are relatively aged, obtained during the time of the Shah's reign and upgraded/overhauled to varying extents. IRINS Bushehr was originally commissioned on NOV1974.

While the interruption of 44th Flotilla's voyage appears to be a setback, it is noteworthy the Republic of South Africa appears to be rendering assistance to Iran's military.

Taftan Airlines second MD-80 series aircraft now in service

Airline: Taftan Air

Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas MD-83 (DC-9-83)

Location: Tehran Mehrabad Airport (THR / OIII)

Registration: EP-CBI (msn 53187)

Photo Date: 17JAN2017

Photographer: Ehsan BG

Notes: This is Taftan Airlines second MD-80 series aircraft, noted “returned to service” on 17JAN2017, joining EP-CBA (msn 49502). Aircraft is former Ukrainian-Mediterranean Airlines, reg. UR-COW.

Potential Russo-American alignment on Syria and its impact on Iran

The Iranians appear to be expressing a sense of trepidation towards a potential rapprochement between the incoming U.S. Administration and Russia, enabling an alignment that would signal a tectonic diplomatic change for the the Syrian conflict and perhaps the greater Middle East.

According to Reuters:

Iran's foreign minister said on Tuesday Tehran opposed a U.S. presence at peace talks on Syria in the Kazakh capital next week, after a decision by Russia and Turkey to invite Washington. 

"We have not invited them, and we are against their presence," Iran's Tasnim news agency quoted Mohammad Javad Zarif as saying.

The Iranians had it their war, given the rift between the Obama Administration and Russia over the Syrian conflict. They were able to successfully position their allied forces into the Syrian region, providing an effective ground force partner to Russian combat aviation, culminating in a force of arms victory at the Battle of Aleppo. That military outcome elevated Iran at the diplomatic level; with Russia, Turkey and Iran seemingly determining the fate of Syria, as expressed at Moscow on 20DEC2016.

However, a change in U.S. Administrations offers the prospect of Russo-American rapprochement that, from the Iranian perspective, would only serve to undercut its extraterritorial standings, achieved at a relatively high price in blood and treasury, potentially rendering it the displaced member of the troika, with the U.S., Russia and regional member Turkey effecting the peace in Syria.

The Iranians are wary of this potential outcome. Over the years, multiple times, they've witnessed the Russians imposing their interests over those of the Iranians. There is a history of this sort of thing, a most recent episode being the much delayed delivery of the Russian S-300PM1 (or PMU2) long range surface-to-air missile system to Iran.

This is not to say that Iran does't possess cards to play at the diplomatic table concerning the Syrian conflict. They still maintain an expeditionary ground force drawn from various allied sources in the region. They also possess cultural links and a level of influence with the Syrian Arab Republic and related Syrian armed forces.

That said, Russia’s military cards on the table, so to speak, show the provision of indispensable logistical support in the form of heavy weapon and air support, exacting decisive results on the battlefield. Moreover, the United States and Russia, potentially aligned on the issue of Syrian conflict, would make a formidable presence at the United Nations Security Council.

Furthermore, among the issues the United States could accord favoring Russian Federation interests in exchange for a weakening of support towards Iran and its standing in the region, might be acceptance-- even informally-- of the 2014 Crimean status referendum, with acceptance of the resulting implications that would ensue.

There may be more to say on this potential in the days and weeks following the inauguration of the new U.S. Administration, whereupon policy directives will be publicly unveiled and executed.

 

Imagery uploaded on social media 17JAN2017 depicting T-62M main battle tanks supplied to Syrian military from Russian Ground Forces stocks.

Syrian Prime Minister Imad Khamis with IRIN Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, on 17JAN2017 in Tehran. Note: Shamkhani is of Iranian Arab descent.

[photo: Omid Vahabzadeh at Fars News Agency]

U.S. Congress bill seeks to investigate Iran Air

Illustration of potential Iran Air Boeing 777-300ER series [rendering by Bobby Catone]

A bill in Congress has been introduced that could potentially block civilian passenger jet deals between Airbus and Boeing and Iran.

According to CNN:

Peter Roskam, a Republican member of the House, introduced a bill on Friday to initiate an investigation by the Trump administration's Director of National Intelligence into Iran Air and the nation's other airlines.

If Iran Air or any other airline were to be found to support the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps or foreign terrorist organizations, the airline would be added to the U.S. sanctions list and be prevented from receiving new aircraft or U.S.-made parts. That would effectively freeze the sale of jets from Boeing to Iran.

The legislation would exert little control over the Airbus aircraft that are already delivered, but the airline would not be able to receive spare parts for those planes, or receive any maintenance outside of Iran. If Iran Air received maintenance or parts outside of Iran, that provider would be barred from doing business with the U.S. market.

What is at stake from an American standpoint, according to Boeing is the sale of 80 aircraft that includes 50 737 MAX 8s, 15 777-300ERs and 15 777-9s, valued at $16.6 billion at list prices.

COMMENT: Back in 2012 the Obama Administration identified Iran Air or its freight division of ferrying weapons to Syria, so linkage to the IRGC-QF appears plausible.

What is clear is that for a majority in Congress, the passenger aircraft deal made possible by JCPOA remains unpalatable. First and foremost, it would initiate a level normalization of relations between the U.S. and Iran, as well as for Western allies.

Passenger jetliners serve as potential transports during wartime. The United States has a record of using such aircraft and related carriers during wartime. So do Iran and their allies. For example during the buildup for the Battle of Aleppo, Iran-supported Iraqi PMF were ferried from Iraqi airports using civilian jetliners.

Iran Air has a history of sanctions being levied against it. Back in 2006 the U.S. allowed the EU to resume spare parts sales and deliveries and more recently the JCPOA removed U.S. sanctions from the airline.

The Iranians appeared to have recently shifted American-origin passenger jetliner aircraft operated by airlines still under sanction, over to Iran Air. This appears to be the case with IRIG Boeing 737-286/Adv reg. EP-AGA (msn 21317); no longer operated by Meraj Air but now maintained by Iran Air (see photo below).

There is a lot at stake in this potential development, including:
1) Tens of billions of dollars to the aerospace industry
2) The political fate of a moderate Iranian president in the upcoming election
3) The landmark Iran nuclear deal, itself.

IRIG Boeing 737-286/Adv reg. EP-AGA, as it appeared 12JAN2017 at the Iran Air maintenance section at THR [photo: Mehdi Bolourian at Fars News Agency].

Iran Air set to receive undelivered Avianca Brasil A332 from Airbus

(click photos to expand)

Imagery of next Airbus destined for Iran Air service: Airbus A330-243E reg. F-WXAJ (msn 1540). [photo: Gary Morris]

This is undelivered Avianca Brasil reg. PR-OCL, with first flight 02JUN2014. Iran Air reg. for aircraft will be EP-IJA.

Imagery in this post depicts ferry of aircraft at Teruel Airport (TEV) on 12JAN2017, proceeding to Châteauroux-Centre "Marcel Dassault" Airport (CHR) for paint and delivery.

 

It is said new Iran Air aircraft are being purchased with cash, through Bank Saderat Iran. Delivery of EP-IJA is scheduled to be in 25 days.

The future Iran Air Airbus A330-243E reg. EP-IJA (msn 1540) at TEV on 12JAN2017

New Iran Air A321 arrival at Mehrabad Airport in Tehran

(click photos to expand)

On final approach: Flight IR700, Iran Air's new A321 reg. EP-IFA arrives at Mehrabad Airport (THR / OIII) in Tehran on 12JAN2017 at 14:46 hrs. local time.

Delivery route from Airbus to Iran: XFW-TLS-THR.

Enthusiastic water salute rendered for arriving EP-IFA

The delivery is the first from a firm order placed by Iran Air in December 2016 for 100 Airbus aircraft (46 single aisle and 54 wide-body jets) to renew and expand its fleet. [source: Airbus]

With sanctions withdrawn, EP-IFA represents the first newly manufactured aircraft delivered to Iran Air in thirty-seven years.

Iran Air A321-211(WL) reg. EP-IFA (msn 7418)

Note in background: IRIAF Boeing (Elicotteri Meridionali) CH-47C Chinook (219).

Members of the press assembled for arrival of EP-IFA

Note in background: IRIG Boeing 737-286/Adv reg. EP-AGA (msn 21317). This refurbished forty-year-old aircraft serves the Iranian government as a VIP aircraft and is maintained by Iran Air.

EP-IFA directed towards Iran Air hangar for passenger disembark and arrival event

EP-IFA received within Iran Air hangar at THR

EP-IFA passenger disembark including IRIG and Airbus VIPs

Disembarking VIPs: 

Fabrice Brégier, Airbus CEO (left)

Abbas Ahmad Akhond, Iranian Minister of Roads and Urban Development (center)

Farhad Parvaresh, Chairman and Managing Director of Iran Air (background, center)

Arrival event for EP-IFA within Iran Air hangar at THR

Ali Akbar Salehi, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, with Airbus CEO Fabrice Brégier. Salehi was instrumental in achieving the JCPOA, clearing the way for new passenger airline aircraft deliveries to Iran.

According to Airbus: "The delivery complies with all relevant international laws. Airbus coordinated closely with regulators in the EU, US and elsewhere to ensure understanding and full compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA)." [source]

Iran Air EP-IFA air crew member before port side CFM International CFM56-5B3/3 high-bypass turbofan aircraft engine

Photos: Mohammad Ali Marizad at Tasnim News Agency,  Mehdi Bolourian at Fars News Agency

Next Iran ambassador to Iraq is IRGC-QF general

File photo: IRGC-QF Brig. Gen. Iraj Masjedi (photo: mashhadpayam.ir)

Various Iranian news agencies are stating the next Iranian ambassador to Iraq will be IRGC-QF Brig. Gen. Iraj Masjedi; replacing another with ties to IRGC-QF,  Hassan Danaeifar, who is set to conclude his six-year term.

Comment: If the reports are accurate, it is noteworthy in the fact that IRGC-QF Brig. Gen. Iraj Masjed has served as a senior advisor to IRGC-QF Maj. Gen. Soleimani. As Iraq is currently a battleground, Iran's leadership appears to derive the need of placement as ambassador an IRGC-QF officer.

With factionalism that is prevalent in Iranian politics, one can speculate that possibly as a result of the IRGC-QF victory at the Battle of Aleppo, Soleimani's star has risen from where it may have dipped before at the Battle of Tikrit.

Soleimani's role in Iran's armed expeditionary force efforts in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and elsewhere is more diplomatic, in ways somewhat similar to USA Gen. Eisenhower's role at ETO during World War II. Like Ike, Soleimani, puts together and deploys arrays of disparate forces, and is involved in operational decision making. He is not a battlefield commander. The public exposure Soleimani is accorded on Iranian media suggests he may be intended as a potential presidential candidate in 2017 or 2021.

Iraj Masjedi, as he appears in civvies

Iran military leadership attendees at Rasfanjani's funeral

Iran media imagery of Iran's military leadership attending the laying to rest of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani on 10JAN2017:

Left to right:

- IRI Defense Minister Brig. Gen. Hossein Dehghan

- IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari

- Chairman of AFGS Maj. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri

Center: IRGC-QF Commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani

Artesh Commander Maj. Gen. Ataollah Salehi (in uniform)

Maj. Gen. Hassan Firouzabadi (Ret), former Chairman of the AFGS

IRGC Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi, Special Advisor to Supreme Leader

IRGCN Commander Commodore Ali Fadavi (uniformed)

Commander of Tehran Police Force Brig. Gen. Hossein Sajedinia

Ammar al-Hakim, leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Saraya Ashura militia commander

COMMENT: Interesting to see Iran's military leadership attending the laying to rest of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, given the political backdrop following the 2009 election and Rasfanjani falling out of favor with establishment elements of the political right. However, projections of political unity are a key theme for this country that considers itself under constant national security threat.

Remarkable to see ISCI leader Ammar al-Hakim in attendance, given the history of the Iran-Iraq War and Rasfanjani's record as high ranking Iranian commander during that period. Iranian and Iraqi relations have never been so close in the modern period, since Operation Iraqi Freedom forcefully effected regime change.

Photos: 
- Taha Jalilzade and Armin Karami at Tasnim News Agency
- Leader.ir

Why is Iran confronting USN warships in the Persian Gulf?

 

File photo: IRGCN 13 m catamaran craft during “Great Prophet” maneuvers in 2010 (Photo: Mahdi Marizad at Fars News Agency) 

USS Mahan (DDG 72) Arleigh Burke-class destroyer on 08JAN2017 fired three shots into the water from an onboard machine gun as a warning to Iranian patrol boats who “approached at a high rate of speed".

Many ask why Iran would send relatively much less powerful craft against the might of the United States Navy. As this is part of a pattern of activity exercised by the IRGCN, on 06SEP2016 Alex Lockie at Business Insider queried Cliff Kupchan on the matter. His view is typical of most. This is what he said:

"In my view, [Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic] Khamenei decided it's time to send a message: I’m here and I’m unhappy," Cliff Kupchan, chairman of Eurasia Group and an expert on Iran, told Business Insider in a phone interview.

According to Kupchan, the Iranian navy carries out these stunts under directions straight from the top because of frustrations with the Iran nuclear deal. Despite billions of dollars in sanction relief flowing into Iran following the deal, Kupchan says Iran sees the US as "preventing European and Asian banks from moving into Iran and financing Iranian businesses," and therefore not holding up their end of the Iran nuclear deal.

With respect to Mr. Kupchan, he and others like him are off the mark. This writer can offer a number of different explanations in reference to IRGCN high speed patrol boat intercepts of USN vessels in the Persian Gulf.

In effect, these actions are intended to cause course corrections to USN vessels away from Iranian shores, similar to PLANAF intercepts of USN aircraft.

There are a number of military-related rationales for such encounters, including observation of USN responses, effectiveness of IRGCN craft pursuit and maneuvering against USN vessels, and the rendering of such encounters as a routine that with time possibly fosters USN complacency.

There are also obvious military points of contention in the region between Iranian and American military forces, including backing certain opposing sides in Syria as well as competing for influence among Iraq's military forces. Looked at from this perspective, Iranian assertiveness can be seen as similar to Russian military flexing as a consequence of Western responses towards the Ukraine conflict.

Moreover, the consistent denominator for all these displays that the Russians, Chinese and Iranian share is a projection of defending sovereignty, as nations exercising an independent foreign policy based on their own self-identied national interests. That this becomes points of contention with the U.S.-led global security order is manifested by such displays of IRGCN intercepts of much more powerful naval vessels.

There is a great danger to these encounters, and that is the operation can lead to actual combat and war. During the 2016 presdiential campaign, current PEOTUS stated:

"With Iran, when they circle our beautiful destroyers with their little boats and they make gestures at our people that they shouldn't be allowed to make, they will be shot out of the water," Trump said to loud cheers.

PEOTUS becomes U.S. commander-in-chief on 20JAN2017.

Rasfanjani, former wartime de facto C-in-C, passes away at 82

 

Above: Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani during the Iran-Iraq War with Ali Sayad Shirazi, commander of the Ground Forces of the Iranian Army

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, former de facto wartime C-in-C during the Iran-Iraq War and president during the postwar economic rebuild passed away 08JAN2017. He was 82.

Rafsanjani is generally credited with effecting a command and control system and means of prosecuting the war within Iran's limited training and resources, into a force that nearly won the war against Saddam Hussein and Baath-led Iraq. However the combined support of the United States, USSR, France, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait assisted Saddam Hussein succeeded in thwarting Iranian war aims. Ironically, it would take the American military invasion of Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) to realize those same Iranian war aims, to where we observe the current situation as it is now.

More of the credit, however, for any effective prosecution of the Iran-Iraq war should be awarded to Ali Sayad Shirazi, then commander of the Ground Forces of the Iranian Army. Using an American military Civil War analogy, Rasfanjani was the resolute political figure like Lincoln; with Shirazi the General Grant figure, willing to commit to huge casualties for limited gains. But for the Iranians, there would be no Appomattox.

Since Rasfanjani's handling of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iranians have not committed large numbers of men and formations to military actions in the region. Twice since they have postured with heavy troop and equipment concentrations at their borders-- in 1998 and in 2015, in response to the Taliban and ISIL, respectively--but have not engaged. This may be attributed to Rasfanjani's handling of the Iran-Iraq War and his ultimate counsel to Supreme Leader of Iran Ruhollah Khomeini, where he determined the war could not be won.

Rasfanjani was awarded the military Order of Fath 1st class. The medal is the likeness of three Palm leaves over Khorramshahr's grand mosque (as a symbol of resistance), Flag of Iran and the word "Fath".

Iranian Jasour (“Brave”) APC tactical vehicle

Undated imagery posted at Military.ir of Jasour (“Brave”) APC tactical vehicle. Vehicle is another  observed utilizing American O-GPK styled turret; previous example being the DIO MRAP by Shahid Kolahdooz Industries shown OCT2016. Iranian-supported fighting forces in Iraq field a variety of American-origin combat vehicles equipped with O-GPK type turrets.

Jasour APC tactical vehicle appears to be based on Saipa Diesel (Volvo) NH12 rolling chassis. Headlamp and taillight units also appear to be taken from NH12, possibly of FAP origin.

Swedish Volvo Trucks Corporation was reported in MAY2015 to have resumed production activity with Saipa Diesel in Iran, after a period where its activity had halted due to sanctions. The Iran nuclear deal and the successful negotiations leading up to it spurred Volvo to resume operations in the Islamic Republic.