IRGC-ASF Ballistic Missiles at Sacred Defense Parade 2017

IRGC-ASF Khorramshahr intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)

IRGC-ASF Khorramshahr intermediate-range ballistic missile (MRBM)

IRGC-ASF Qiam ("Uprising") tactical short-range ballistic missile (SRBM)

IRGC-ASF Emad ("Pillar") medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM)

IRGC-ASF Sejil ("Baked clay, Koranic event") medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM)

IRGC-ASF Ghadr-F (“Intensity-F”) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM)

IRGC-ASF Zolfiqar ("Sword bestowed by Muhammad") short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) (x2)

Video:

Photos: Hossein Mersadi at Fars News Agency, Majid Haghdoust at Mehr News Agency

Key takeaways from Iran and the U.S. response towards ballistic missile test

A brief listing of takeaways by Iran to the U.S. response towards the test launch of a ballistic missile (or SLV platform) occurring 29JAN2017:

— Iran determined the new U.S. Administration responded to the ballistic missile test in nearly the same manner as the preceding administration, in applying roughly a dozen new sanctions on individuals and entities. Moreover, the tendered response remained consistently symbolic. The U.S. did not unilaterally withdraw from JCPOA, invoke a military show of force or draw a red line for imminent initiation of armed conflict.

— The political spectrum of Iran rallied in support of the defense doctrine based on the deterrent force provided by IRGC-ASF, with its developing second-strike ballistic missile capability.

( IRGC-ASF were subsequently put on simulated alert status during exercises held on 04FEB2017 in Semnan Province. The drills had likely been planned in advance.)

— Iran’s leadership noted a resumption of the country being targeted by the U.S. for combat actions taken by regional allies, or armed groups it is sympathetic towards. In this case, it was the Houthi naval naval engagement with a RSNF Al Madinah-class frigate off the coast of Yemen. This resumption signals a return to relations where they stood during the Bush Administration, severing a level of cooperation engaged upon with the Obama Administration that saw signing of JCPOA, rapid release of trespassing USN personnel in the Persian Gulf, the negotiated release of American citizens in Yemen, etc.

COMMENT: Two certainties emerged from this episode:

— The United States will make all ballistic missile and SLV launches public and continue to render some level of response. (The variable posed is whether responses will remain within the status quo.)

— Iran will continue to maintain its defense doctrine based on deterrence, with further development and testing of its ballistic missile force.

Khorramshahr MRBM said to be related to DPRK Musudan

File photo: Hwasong-10 (Musudan) IRBMs seen at a military parade in Pyongyang

U.S. officials at the Pentagon are linking the Khorramshahr MRBM to that of the Hwasong-10 (aka BM-25, Musudan) mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile developed by North Korea.

According to Kyle Mizokami:

An anonymous U.S. government official told Reuters the missile was launched from a test site near Senman [sic], east of the Iranian capital of Tehran, and said it was the same type of missile last tested in April 2016.

As pointed out by arms control expert Jeffrey Lewis on Twitter, the Pentagon identified the July 2016 missile as a locally produced version of the Musudan, a North Korean intermediate-range missile. Also known as the Hwaso

The Musudan has been adapted from a submarine-launched missile to a road-mobile missile, and is launched from 12-wheeled heavy transporters. The missile has a payload of 2,000 to 2,500 pounds and a theoretical maximum range of 2,500 miles. The range of the missile is open to some debate because so far, despite Pyongyang's claims to the contrary, it hasn't been successfully tested. North Korea may have launched as many as eight Musudans in 2016 alone, and not a single launch was considered successful by outside observers.

COMMENT: Iran has yet to publicly unveil an adapted design related to the Hwasong-10. However the Khorramshahr has been verbally publicized on 25SEP2016 by MODAFL Brig. Gen. Hossein Deghan at an assemblage of Iran’s Parliament.

U.S. intelligence sources are said to have ascertained this ballistic missile type. If accurate, then the Khorramshahr ballistic missile project is likely being developed and tested by Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO).

It is possible the Hwasong-10 and Khorramshahr projects may represent a binational, dual agency approach towards the development, testing and production of an IRBM.

Note: another possible explanation for the test is that it's related to Iran's Simorgh ("Phoenix") series space launch vehicle (SLV) program.

Currently the UNSC has referred the 29JAN2017 Iranian test launch to its committee on Iran, for investigation.

Iran test fires 'Khorramshahr' ballistic missile

U.S. officials report that on 29JAN2017 Iran test fired a ballistic missile from the Semnan Missile Complex. Identified as  a Khorramshahr MRBM, "the medium-range ballistic missile flew 600 miles before exploding."

The Khorramshahr MRBM was previously publicized on 25SEP2016 by MODAFL Brig. Gen. Hossein Dehghan before an assemblage of Iran's parliament. It was identified for its "high-precision" strike capability, as a component of Iran's deterrent-based, second-strike defense doctrine.

Controversy exists over the wording and intent of U.N. Security Council resolution 1929, whereby "Iran is prohibited from undertaking any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons..." The United States position has been to include existing and under-development Iranian MRBMs; while Iran specifically accepted the wording durning negotiation of the JCPOA, as meaning missiles capable of carrying an existing Iranian nuclear weapon, which Iran denies the existence of as well as any program to develop such a device. Moreover it is considered unlikely that such test launches would garner the necessary votes at UNSC to find Iran in violation.

For its part, Iran claims its deterrent-based defense doctrine mandates a credible second-strike capability, which in turn requires continued development and periodic testing.

However, such test launches run the risk of being cited by the Trump Administration as part of a listing of cause for unilaterally pulling out of JCPOA.