Iran-supported Iraqi PMF advocates expulsion of U.S. nationals

This weekend’s signing of a U.S. executive order barring immingration and travel by Iraqi citizens into the United States is having a potential ripple effect on CJTF-OIR.

According to Reuters:

Popular Mobilization, a coalition of mainly Shiite Muslim paramilitary groups armed and trained by Iran to fight Islamic State, urged Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi's government to expel US nationals.

Influential Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr said on Sunday American citizens should leave Iraq. "It would be arrogance for you[Americans] to enter Iraq and other countries freely while barring them entrance to your country ... and therefore you should get your nationals out," he said on his website.

The IRGC is sure to capitalize on Iraqi popular reaction to this ban; where inside Iraq a contest of influence has been playing out between Iran and the United States stretching as far back as OIF. Now, however, is an ensuing, critical period of intensifying, competing interests as the Mosul military campaign culminates in the defeat of ISIS.

U.S. interests in the region would have the PMF stand down after the effective defeat of ISIS, having ISF provide security for the Republic of Iraq. However, the executive order effectively undercuts the Iraqi PM while serving to bolster popular regional perceptions towards that shared by the IRGC and PMF. That is to say, Iraq is now being rendered the same as Iran, pairing the two by means of a U.S. policy orientation.

Perhaps an intended effect of the U.S. executive order is to exert leverage on the Iraqi government to separate from Iran, during forthcoming negotiations between the Trump Administration and the Iraqi government. If so, publicly the Iraqi PM might be enabled with a rescinding of the ban, while the liberation of Mosul is at hand. Furthermore, this might even fit within the 90-day time frame of the executive order.

Brief take on ISW’s “Iran Positions for Reset in Iraq after Recapture of Mosul”

What follows is a brief take on excerpts from the ISW blog post "Iran Positions for Reset in Iraq after Recapture of Mosul" by Emily Anagnostos. Note: Anagnostos' text in italics, Mark Pyruz’s comments in yellow.

ISW: “Iran has tolerated U.S. presence in Iraq because the U.S. provided sufficient airpower and training to combat ISIS.”

Intel on Iran: Additionally, Iran may have identified American military logistical support as critical for ISF to more effectively combat ISIL.

ISW: “It has also backed Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi because his premiership was a condition of U.S. support and because PM Abadi is too weak to resist Iranian control.”

Intel on Iran: Iraq’s territorial integrity remains a priority for Iran. Additionally, Iran calculated Iraqi parliamentarian perception of Abadi as that of being “installed” by the U.S., effectively burdening the prospective leader from the start and indeed among Iraq's parliament the prevailing popular perception of Abadi remains that of a weak PM. Being the follower and not the initiator of the Battle of Tikrit, as well as his failure to deliver the liberation of Mosul before the end of 2016 further served to reinforce this perception. However the liberation of Mosul may indeed render a popular boost for the PM, if only temporarily.

ISW: “Pro-Iranian groups in Iraq will likely consider the recapture of Mosul as the end of major anti-ISIS operations in Iraq and continued U.S. presence unnecessary and unwelcomed.”

Intel on Iran: Iran faces a similar focus of popular and legislative attention following the liberation of Mosul and effective defeat of ISIL. That the Iran-supported PMF will portray its raison d'être and mission to that of a national guard force appears likely.

ISW: “Recent U.S. statements suggest that the U.S. may increase, not decrease, its involvement in Iraq after Mosul, which is likely accelerating Iran’s efforts to expel the U.S. from the region.”

Intel on Iran: Recent statements intended for the U.S. domestic audience regarding potential seizure of Iraqi oil resources as well as travel and immigration bans from Iraq into the U.S. serve to provide Iran with political points of alignment with their Iraq counterparts, with which to exploit increased levels of influence. This burdens efforts towards effecting an American primacy of influence over Iran, in Iraq.

ISW: “Iran has started to consolidate its proxies in Iraq, including a reconciliation between Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr and senior pro-Iranian officials, in order to both increase pressure on PM Abadi against further Western support and establish Iraq as a base from which it can project regional influence.“

Intel on Iran: That there are specific points of convergence within common regional interests shared by Iraq and Iran can not be denied. After the fall of Mosul and with it a more stabilized security environment in general, measures of economic support may offer the most effective means of leverage for the United States in the contest of influence in Iraq.

ISW: “Former PM Nouri al-Maliki will aim to convince Iran that he, as prime minister, would support the power shift from the U.S. to Iran in order to secure Iran’s political support for 2018 parliamentary elections.”

Intel on Iran: The political relations between Iran and Iraq are more complex and more dynamic than the former simply seeking to dominate the latter. For example, there are instances where Iraqi political figures line up with Iranian political figures, in forms of transnational factionalism, that in effect exert influences and sometimes outcomes in both or either country.

Iran maintains relationships with various sections of the Iraqi landscape that stretch back decades. Moreover, Iranian political support remains relevant in Iraqi politics. Whether or not American resources should be exerted in attempting to subvert this prevailing regional condition requires U.S. policy advocates to calculate the chances of success, matched up with and against expected required resource allocation for the desired outcome(s). Put bluntly, this contest may involve an adroitly administered application of what is generally considered constituting “nation building.”